Verified: Google Cloud London disruption and recovery
Google’s official incident record places the start at 23:08 PDT on 19 October: 07:08 BST on 20 October. It identifies a power event in europe-west2-b, within London’s europe-west2 region. The 12:12 BST update says the power event was mitigated.
Google now records the incident as ending at 07:00 PDT (15:00 BST). Its 07:03 PDT (15:03 BST) notice says the affected products were mitigated for most customers, and directed any remaining affected customers to contact support. Google said no further status-page updates would follow and that an incident analysis would be published after its investigation. That closes Google’s public incident timeline, but is not proof that every dependent payment service recovered at the same time.
What UK regulators confirmed after the incident
A joint Bank of England, PRA and FCA letter dated 4 November says the outage disrupted customer-facing banking and payments services at some UK financial firms, plus internal operational and risk systems. Effects were not uniform because firms used Google Cloud in different ways and with different configurations.
The authorities reported material disruption for some consumers, but no material ongoing consumer effects, no implications for market integrity or wider financial stability and no indication of malicious activity. Their post-incident review is under way, with a fuller response due by 20 January 2027. The letter does not say Google caused every concurrent provider incident.
Verified: Worldpay resolution and separate EFT POS notice
Worldpay first posted INC0697249 at 06:54 UTC (07:54 BST), describing third-party issuer errors on its Worldwide Payment Gateway. Its 09:41 UTC (10:41 BST) update named Revolut and described errors across multiple platforms. This is the publication time of the first notice, not a verified start time for every failed transaction.
Worldpay marked INC0697249 resolved at 14:36 UTC (15:36 BST), saying the third party had resolved the issue. Its overview then showed All Systems Operational, including Authorization & Payments, Acquiring, Funding & Payouts, and Portals & Reporting. Worldpay’s closure supports an all-clear for that Worldpay incident, not for every Revolut service or every merchant payment.
Worldpay separately posted resolved incident INC0697981 at 14:30 UTC (15:30 BST). It reported increased EFT POS authorisation failures on Access Worldpay and WPG, affecting some transaction results, while saying Worldpay systems remained operational. The notice provides no start time and does not identify Revolut, Google Cloud or a relationship with INC0697249; it must be treated as a separate incident.
Independently reported UK impact
Reuters reported disruption to UK banking websites and mobile apps and later reported that Google cloud services were back up. Google closed its public incident timeline at 15:00 BST and Worldpay resolved INC0697249 at 15:36 BST. Revolut moved through changing partial-availability snapshots before its UK status page showed all systems operational at 18:55 BST. These are provider-specific closure signals; they do not prove that every individual transaction completed or that all participants recovered simultaneously.
AP separately reported disrupted online services at Lloyds, Halifax, HSBC and Revolut. Its reported 06:08 UTC cloud-outage start corresponds to 07:08 BST and is consistent with the official Google timestamp conversion. These reports corroborate material UK impact, but do not establish that every merchant, terminal, acquirer or transaction was affected.
GOV.UK Pay provides a useful scope check from a live payment service. At 11:22 BST it said the issue was specific to some Revolut cardholders and reported no issue elsewhere in Pay, Worldpay, Stripe or other cards. At 11:39 BST it described only a very small number of intermittent failures while Pay itself remained fully operational. It reported failure and error rates back within normal parameters at 14:16 BST and closed its notice at 16:13 BST with all components operational. This is primary evidence about GOV.UK Pay only; it is not a nationwide failure count.
What official sources do not establish
The reviewed official Google and Worldpay notices do not establish that Google’s power event caused Revolut’s payment disruption. Their timing alone is insufficient evidence. The title covers concurrent incidents, not a proven chain of causation.
Revolut’s UK status page moved from 30 partially unavailable services to changing partial-availability snapshots, then showed all systems operational at 18:55 BST. The page did not expose a precise restoration time for each function, so the update records the verified current state rather than inventing a minute-by-minute recovery sequence. We have not verified a security breach, loss of funds or nationwide terminal failure.
What to do if a Revolut card is declined
After resolution, treat any historic decline as a payment outcome to reconcile rather than proof that the terminal needs replacing. Check whether the original attempt failed, reversed, completed or remains pending before asking the customer to try again.
If cards from several banks fail, or the terminal cannot connect, follow your provider’s normal connectivity and support checks. Give support the time, error message and a non-sensitive transaction reference through its approved channel. Do not share card numbers, security codes or customer personal details on public posts.
- Check your terminal or provider dashboard to establish whether the first payment succeeded, failed or remains uncertain before attempting another collection. Do not repeatedly retry a pending or ambiguous transaction.
- Offer a card from a different issuer or another payment method you already accept. Apple Pay or Google Pay using the same underlying Revolut card can encounter the same issuer issue.
- Use only your normal approved payment procedures. Do not bypass security checks, record card details or promise that an alternative will work.
- Check Worldpay, Revolut and your own provider’s official status pages. If you use another acquirer, this report does not establish that its services are affected.
What to say to a customer
“There are reported payment-service issues today, but this card decline has not been linked to one confirmed cause. We’ll check the payment status first. You can then use another card or a payment method we already accept.”
Do not promise a recovery time or say a payment is safe to repeat without checking its status. A provider’s estimated recovery time is not a guarantee.
How this article is maintained
This article records official incident information at the timestamps shown. The tracked incident is resolved in the latest provider pages checked, while individual transactions can still require reconciliation. Material corrections will be recorded here rather than presented as a fresh, unrelated outage.
We retain the original incident timeline, identify corrections and distinguish provider statements from our guidance. We will mark an incident resolved only when the relevant official notice supports it. No customer data is collected for these updates.
Sources and dates
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 15:42 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 19 Nov 2026, 13:58 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 18:55 UK time
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 18:55 UK time
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 15:42 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 15:42 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 17:24 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 20 Oct 2026, 20:37 UK time · Published 2026-10-20
Checked 8 Nov 2026, 08:54 UK time · Published 2026-11-04
Update log
- . Rechecked the dated Worldpay incident and clarified its closing time. Use the provider’s current status page for a fresh decline.
- . 8 November post-incident update: a 4 November joint Bank of England, PRA and FCA letter confirmed that the Google Cloud London outage materially disrupted some consumers, but identified no malicious activity, no material ongoing consumer effects and no implications for wider financial stability. The authorities are conducting a post-incident review and expect to report further by 20 January 2027. This does not establish that Google caused every concurrent provider incident.
- . 20:37 BST scope update: GOV.UK Pay’s incident history provides primary evidence that its observed impact was limited. At 11:39 BST it reported only a very small number of intermittent failures while Pay itself remained operational; at 14:16 BST failure and error rates were normal; at 16:13 BST it closed the notice with all components operational. This evidence is specific to GOV.UK Pay and does not quantify total UK impact.
- . 18:55 BST closure update: Revolut UK now showed All systems operational. Together with Google’s closed incident record and Worldpay’s resolved issuer-related incident, this supports marking the tracked incident resolved. Individual failed, reversed or pending transactions still require status checks.
- . 18:01 BST update: Revolut UK improved from 30 to 23 partially unavailable services and showed one service under maintenance. This is verified recovery progress, not a final resolution. Worldpay remained All Systems Operational; Google’s public incident timeline remained closed.
- . 17:24 BST update: Worldpay marked issuer-related INC0697249 resolved at 15:36 BST and its overview showed All Systems Operational. Worldpay also posted separate resolved EFT POS incident INC0697981 at 15:30 BST; it reported increased authorisation failures affecting transaction results but gave no start time or link to the Revolut/Google events. Revolut UK still showed 30 services partially unavailable, so the article remains in recovering status.
- . 15:42 BST update: Google’s official record now shows the europe-west2 incident ended at 15:00 BST. Its 15:03 BST notice says mitigation covered most customers but a very small number required support after the main recovery. Worldpay INC0697249 remained unresolved with Authorization & Payments degraded, and Revolut UK still showed 30 services partially unavailable. The wider payment incident therefore remains in recovery, not resolved.
- . 14:41 BST recheck: Google remained in recovery with no final all-clear; Worldpay INC0697249 remained unresolved with Authorization & Payments degraded; Revolut UK showed 30 services partially unavailable. Reuters and AP corroborated material UK banking disruption, without establishing universal merchant impact.
- . Initial official-source verification: Google’s 13:44 BST recovery update, Worldpay’s unresolved Revolut-related incident and operational acquiring/funding components, and Revolut’s partial-unavailability page. The reviewed sources did not establish shared causation or a specific terminal impact.
